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FREE SPEECH HAS GOTTEN VERY
EXPENSIVE: RETHINKING POLITICAL
SPEECH REGULATION IN A
POST-TRUTH WORLD
JOHN A. BARRETT, JR.†
INTRODUCTION
Protecting free speech has been a foundational principle of
American democracy since the nation’s founding.1 A core element
of free speech has long been a prohibition on regulating political
speech.2 The principle behind this protection holds that citizens
are free to make whatever political pronouncements they wish and
that their speech shall remain free from government suppression.
Even within the limited exceptions to unfettered political speech,
like defamation or libel, the speech is not banned but may merely
result in liability.3 A premise underlying this view is that competing viewpoints, by being made available to us all, will allow
the best ideas to emerge and for truth to prevail over falsehood.4
Even though such an approach may be imperfect at times, the
historic view holds that the risks associated with regulating
political speech are far worse: allowing the government and those
in power to suppress dissenting voices and thereby consolidate
power.5
However, as the United States proceeds through the 2020
election process, American democracy is under siege, and its
historic viewpoint concerning the need for unfettered political
†
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discourse is being challenged by the realities of a post-truth,
globally interconnected era. Ten years after Citizens United v.
FEC,6 campaign spending continues to grow exponentially, and
with it the corrupting influence of money in politics becomes ever
more entrenched.7 Politicians lie about readily verifiable matters, often claiming they never said something when they have
been videotaped saying what they now deny.8 Those acting on
their behalf release false and misleading advertisements attacking the candidate’s opponent, as well as doctored photographs
and videos purporting to show compromising events that never
occurred.9 Foreign state actors attack United States elections by
sowing discord and spreading disinformation.10
In addition to these threats and tied directly to how the
United States regulates political speech, America finds itself
deeply divided, with its citizens rejecting facts and information
they disagree with as fake.11 People who should be able to vote
are disenfranchised by mechanisms including unduly strict voter
identification standards, inadequate access to polling stations,

6

See generally 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Thomas B. Edsall, After Citizens United, A Vicious Cycle of Corruption, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/opinion/citizens-unitedcorruption-pacs.html [https://perma.cc/HLD7-NNMJ].
8
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https://www.vox.com/2017/11/16/16643614/trump-administration-corruption-russiainvestigation [https://perma.cc/4QS2-JB4K]; see also Oliver Hahl, Minjae Kim &
Ezra W. Zuckerman Sivan, The Authentic Appeal of the Lying Demagogue:
Proclaiming the Deeper Truth About Political Illegitimacy, 83 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 5
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107 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1063 (2019).
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74 MONT. L. REV. 53, 55 (2013); Amanda Taub, The Real Story About Fake News Is
Partisanship, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/upshot/
the-real-story-about-fake-news-is-partisanship.html [https://perma.cc/63VX-NX2K].
7

2020]

FREE SPEECH HAS GOTTEN VERY EXPENSIVE

617

and politically motivated purging of voter rolls.12 Overwhelming
majorities vote for candidates of one party in a state, yet the
other party controls the state legislature and wins a majority of
that state’s seats in the federal House of Representatives due to
gerrymandering.13 The Constitution’s system of checks and balances appears to be failing, as independent branches of government and independent agencies appear to have become agents of
an ever-growing executive branch.14
At such a time, the United States must rethink how its
democracy is structured. The changes required will be broad and
varied to combat these myriad challenges. This Article focuses
on the challenges presented by how the United States regulates
political speech, particularly with the problems associated with
the need for massive sums of money to run for office effectively,
and the proliferation of disinformation being targeted at voters.
The Article begins with an overview of why free speech is an
essential component of democracy that must be protected. It
then turns to an analysis of the problems being created by the
current legal framework governing political speech. Next, the
Article reviews the constitutional and regulatory parameters and
the limits they place on regulating political speech, including
some recent legislative proposals for change. Finally, different
possible solutions are evaluated. After considering alternatives
to address these concerns, the Article argues for two courses of
action that should be taken to improve democracy by adjusting
how America regulates political speech—one radical and longterm, and one more modest and capable of immediate implementation. In the long run, the Constitution should be amended to
ban all television and digital political advertising. More immediately, Congress should adopt a robust regime for rating political
advertisements and news programming that evaluates truthful-

12
Danielle Root & Adam Barclay, Voter Suppression During the 2018 Midterm
Elections, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 20, 2018, 9:03 AM), https://www
.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2018/11/20/461296/voter-suppression2018-midterm-elections/ [https://perma.cc/4NMK-89TA]; Ian Samuel, Rigging the
Vote: How the American Right is on the Way to Permanent Minority Rule, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 4, 2018, 7:55 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/04/
america-minority-rule-voter-suppression-gerrymandering-supreme-court [https://perma
.cc/X72Y-VTU7].
13
Samuel, supra note 12.
14
Edward J. Larson, Checks and Balances . . . and Trump, BULWARK (Jan. 10,
2020), https://thebulwark.com/checks-balances-and-trump/ [https://perma.cc/K8U7LMFX].
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ness, with such ratings being displayed as part of the content
evaluated. While these solutions will not fix all the problems
challenging modern democracy in the United States, they would
solve the challenges being caused by the way political speech is
currently regulated.
I. FREE SPEECH AND THE ESSENTIAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR DEMOCRACY
A healthy democracy requires a number of things, including
free and fair elections, protection of basic human rights, adherence to the rule of law,15 and free speech. Free speech may well
be the most important ingredient of all.16 Free speech is foundational to how a democratic society is structured and led. It helps
create a marketplace of ideas for voters to choose among in
structuring their societies, allowing the most popular ideas to
become enacted as law and policy.17 Free speech, in the form of
political advertising and debates, also allows voters to get to
know candidates for office and their messages, so that people can
make informed decisions when they vote as to who they want
their leaders to be.18
Just as free speech is foundational for a political marketplace in democracies, it is also essential for creating governmental accountability.19 A democracy elects its leaders based on
the preferences of the populace, and as such, the leaders must be
accountable to the electorate.20 If the elected officials are not
pursuing the goals and policies the voters want, the voters must
be able to replace them. As such, free speech in the short term
allows voters to express their support for or opposition to the proposals and decisions their leaders are making, thereby pressuring leaders to adjust their stances to reflect the desires of their

15

See AUSTL. CONSERVATION FOUND., BUILDING A HEALTHY DEMOCRACY 3
(Sept. 2018) (discussing essential elements of a healthy democracy).
16
Hasen, supra note 11, at 64; Peter Berkowitz, Defending Democratic Norms
Requires Defending Free Speech, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Apr. 7, 2019), https://
www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2019/04/07/defending_democratic_norms_requires
_defending_free_speech_139981.html [https://perma.cc/P6P5-A82A].
17
Nunziato, supra note 4.
18
Evan Richman, Note, Deception in Political Advertising: The Clash Between
the First Amendment and Defamation Law, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 667
(1998).
19
Freedom of the Press, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/free-speech/freedompress [https://perma.cc/F6HL-826L] (last visited May 18, 2021).
20
Henry E. Dugan, Jr., Independent or Accountable, 48 MD. BAR J. 28, 30 (2015).
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electorate. Over a longer term, the ability to criticize the decisions
of one’s leaders allows support to grow for electing new leaders
and for modifying laws and regulations to meet a society’s
changing needs. Regardless of whether it is politicians responding
to constituent pressure, electing new leaders, or approving new
laws, free speech is a key component to creating accountability in
a democracy.
It is also generally accepted that it is best for a democracy to
be designed in a manner that creates a meaningful and realistic
chance for a broadly diverse cross-section of the population to be
elected to office.21 If certain groups in the population can rarely,
if ever, get elected to important positions, those groups are not
really being represented, and thus their views and ideas are far
less likely to be represented in the laws that get enacted.22 For
example, a democracy is substantially weakened if one or more
ethnicities or one gender is precluded from voting. Similarly, a
democracy where the rich and powerful are the only ones that
can mount a successful political campaign essentially disenfranchises the poor and middle-class voters, whose views and preferences are far more likely to be pursued aggressively by someone
from a similar background. Furthermore, the long-term success
of a democracy requires the people to believe that the government they elect is legitimate, and when groups are excluded from
voting or practically excluded from being elected, confidence in
the legitimacy of the government is substantially eroded.23

21

Heba El-Kholy, No Democracy Without Diversity, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PRO(Sept. 19, 2013), https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourperspective/
ourperspectivearticles/2013/09/19/no-democracy-without-diversity-heba-el-kholy.html
[https://perma.cc/FB3L-HEF2]; Bert Gambini, Democracy Depends upon Diversity,
U. BUFF. NEWS CTR. (Aug. 28, 2018), http://www.buffalo.edu/news/releases/2018/
08/031.html [https://perma.cc/4JLA-GUHM].
22
Caterina Bulgarella, Why the Increased Diversity of the Next Congress is a
Victory for Ethics, FORBES (Nov. 19, 2018, 8:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
caterinabulgarella/2018/11/19/why-the-increased-diversity-of-the-next-congress-is-avictory-for-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/SJ2L-3WPD]; Tyra A. Mariani, Why Meaningful
Diversity in Government Matters, PAC. STANDARD (June 14, 2017), https://
psmag.com/news/why-meaningful-diversity-in-government-matters [https://perma.cc
/3YVQ-VU7C].
23
See, e.g., Nancy Scherer, Diversifying the Federal Bench: Is Universal Legitimacy for the U.S. Justice System Possible?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 587, 626 (2011).
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II. PROBLEMS IMPACTING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
AFFECTED BY SPEECH DEREGULATION
A.

Economic Effects on Speech and Elections

The candidate supported by the most money usually wins.24
In recent years, the amount spent on political campaigns has
catapulted to astronomic heights, with spending increasing by
27% per year since 2012.25 Political advertisement spending is
estimated to increase by another 57% from the 2018 election
cycle to 2020, with 2.5 million more advertisements being run.26
In 2008, candidates and outsiders spent over $5.3 billion running
for office.27 By 2016, this amount had grown to $9.8 billion,
which was surprisingly low, caused in part by the relatively low
amount spent by the Trump campaign.28 Michael Bloomberg
alone spent over $1 billion of his own money in his brief
presidential run.29 Forecasts estimate as much as $15 billion will
24
Karl Evers-Hillstrom, More Money, Less Transparency: A Decade Under
Citizens United, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Jan. 14, 2020), https://dkftve4js3etk.cloudfront
.net/news/reports/citizens-united/OpenSecrets-more-money-less%20transparency-adecade-under-citizens-united.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4L5-MHS9].
25
2020 Political Spending Projections, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/f/
?id=0000016b-b029-d027-a97f-f6a95aca0000 [https://perma.cc/6AAF-VLXC] (last visited May 20, 2021). It must be noted that engaging in an apples-to-apples
comparison is tricky for political advertising spending, given that some data looks
only at candidate spending and other data attempts to include outside spending on
behalf of candidates. Further complicating matters, outside spending by certain
groups does not have to be reported.
26
Id.
27
Jeanne Cummings, 2008 Campaign Costliest in U.S. History, POLITICO (Nov.
5, 2008, 5:28 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2008/11/2008-campaign-costliestin-us-history-015283 [https://perma.cc/5L58-KJ3Z].
28
Kate Kaye, Data-Driven Targeting Creates Huge 2016 Political Ad Shift:
Broadcast TV Down 20%, Cable and Digital Way Up, ADAGE (Jan. 3, 2017, 6:45 PM),
https://adage.com/article/media/2016-political-broadcast-tv-spend-20-cable-52/307346
[https://perma.cc/VTP8-P8B6]; see also Reid Wilson, Political Ad Spending Set to
Explode in 2020, THE HILL (Dec. 5, 2019, 2:03 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews
/campaign/473240-political-ad-spending-set-to-explode-in-2020 [https://perma.cc/G5KX4T97]. The Trump campaign spent $322 million on the election, which is $243
million less than Clinton spent in 2016, $453 million less than Obama in 2012, and
$138 million less than Mitt Romney in the same cycle. Jeremy W. Peters & Rachel
Shorey, Trump Spent Far Less Than Clinton, but Paid His Companies Well, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/us/politics/campaignspending-donald-trump-hillary-clinton.html [https://perma.cc/LVA7-FCQ2].
29
Benjamin Siegel & Soo Rin Kim, Mike Blomberg Spent More Than $1 Billion
on Four-Month Presidential Campaign According to Filing (Apr. 20, 2020, 7:21 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/mike-bloomberg-spent-billion-month-presidentialcampaign-filing/story?id=70252435 [https://perma.cc/F5P7-TKBA]; see also Lisa Lerer,
Michael Bloomberg Is Open to Spending $1 Billion To Defeat Trump, N.Y. TIMES
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be spent on 2020 contests, which would be a new record.30 In
comparison, the total spent on in the 2017 United Kingdom
elections was about forty million pounds, a little over fifty million
in United States dollars.31 Another way to look at how important
money is in our electoral process, beyond the amount spent, is to
consider why candidates drop out of a race. Usually it is because
they are not raising enough money to continue in a robust
manner.32
A major reason for these dramatic increases in spending is
the development of super political action committees (“PACs”),
independent advocacy committees that can accept unlimited
contributions, which arose as a consequence of the 2010 decision
in Citizens United v. FEC.33 Unlike other forms of donations to
candidates and their campaigns, super PACs have no restrictions
on the size of contributions people can make.34 Furthermore,
both PACs and super PACs can spend unlimited amounts on
behalf of a candidate.35 While PAC spending has remained relatively constant, super PAC spending has skyrocketed.36 Frequently, the amount spent by super PACs on behalf of a candidate can

(Jan. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/11/us/politics/michael-bloombergspending.html [https://perma.cc/5VH5-T7G6].
30
Kristina Monllos, “Nothing Typical About This Year’s Political Ad Market”: As
Crises Continue Forecasts Predict Higher Than Ever Political Ad Spending, DIGIDAY
(June 17, 2020), https://digiday.com/marketing/nothing-typical-about-this-yearspolitical-ad-market-as-crises-continue-forecasts-predict-higher-than-ever-political-adspending/ [https://perma.cc/6Y5V-FQ7G].
31
Jenny Anderson, The Three Things That Make British Elections so Different
from American Ones, QUARTZ (Nov. 7, 2019), https://qz.com/1743234/the-three-maindifferences-between-us-and-uk-elections/ [https://perma.cc/ZC7Y-K7MU].
32
See, e.g., Elena Schneider, Cash Shortage Hits Dem Presidential Field,
POLITICO (Oct. 16, 2019, 5:17 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/16/2020election-democrats-fundraising-spending-048210 [https://perma.cc/2JWG-S2A6].
33
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); 52 U.S.C. § 30116 (2018);
Contribution Limits, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidatesand-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/contribution-limits/ [https://perma.cc/5YNSYN6X] (last visited May 20, 2021); Andrew Prokop, The Citizens United Era of
Money in Politics, Explained, VOX (July 15, 2015, 11:39 PM), https://www.vox.com
/2015/2/9/18088962/super-pacs-and-dark-money [https://perma.cc/5GGW-2925].
34
52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(4); Contribution Limits, supra note 33; Prokop, supra
note 33.
35
52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8); Contribution Limits, supra note 33; Prokop, supra
note 33.
36
Karl Evers-Hillstrom et al., A Look at the Impact of Citizens United on Its 9th
Anniversary, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Jan. 21, 2019, 12:06 PM), https://www.opensecrets
.org/news/2019/01/citizens-united/ [https://perma.cc/2MB8-W2DS] (reporting $416
million in PAC spending in 2008 and $497 million in spending in 2018).
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equal or exceed the amount spent by the campaign itself.37 In the
ten years of their existence, super PACs had spent approximately
$3 billion before 2020 election spending began ramping up,38 with
total outside spending topping $4.5 billion in the last decade.39
Just under one-quarter of all advertising expenditures for house
races in 2018 were by outside sources.40
Why have political campaigns become so expensive? The
answer is simple: the cost of television advertising. The lion’s
share of the sums described above are being spent to bombard
the airwaves.41 In the 2016 election cycle, broadcast television
spending was 5.5 times greater than the next-highest medium,
cable television.42 Combining these two television formats makes
digital, radio, and newspaper spending comparatively minor.
Getting one’s name and message out on TV is seen as an essential component to getting elected, and TV time is expensive. Of
the $9.8 billion spent in the 2016 election cycle, $4.4 billion was
spent on television advertising.43 And these amounts are set to
explode in the 2020 election. Comparing the first ten months of
2015 to a similar period in 2019, over twice as many political
advertisements had been run on television—and that was before
Michael Bloomberg entered the race.44 Although he did not enter
the race until November 24, 2019,45 Bloomberg spent over $1

37
Since Citizens United, outside parties have spent more than the candidate in
126 races, whereas this had happened only 15 times in the 5 prior election cycles.
Evers-Hillstrom, supra note 24.
38
Ian Vandewalker, Since Citizens United, a Decade of Super PACs, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysisopinion/citizens-united-decade-super-pacs [https://perma.cc/4AE7-4TTF].
39
Evers-Hillstrom, supra note 24.
40
Erika Franklin Fowler et al., The Big Lessons of Political Advertising in 2018,
THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 3, 2018, 6:34 AM), https://theconversation.com/the-biglessons-of-political-advertising-in-2018-107673 [https://perma.cc/G4JN-Z6BQ].
41
Jacob S. Hacker & Nathan Loewentheil, How Big Money Corrupts the Economy, 27 DEMOCRACY 32, 37 (2013), https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/27/howbig-money-corrupts-the-economy/ [https://perma.cc/9SZK-X8U9].
42
Statista Research Department, Political Advertising Spending in the United
States in the 2016 Election Season, by Medium, STATISTA (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www
.statista.com/statistics/470711/presidential-election-season-ad-spend/ [https://perma
.cc/SW39-Q7CT].
43
Kaye, supra note 28.
44
Nathaniel Rakich, We’ve Already Seen Twice as Many Presidential TV Ads
Than at This Point in the 2016 Election, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 23, 2019, 10:08
AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/weve-already-seen-twice-as-many-presidentialtv-ads-as-at-this-point-in-the-2016-election/ [https://perma.cc/675D-MSGH].
45
Dan Merica, Christina Alesci & Jake Tapper, Michael Bloomberg is the Latest
2020 Democratic Hopeful, CNN POL. (Nov. 24, 2019, 1:20 PM), https://www.cnn
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billion on his brief presidential campaign, beating out secondplace spender Tom Steyer at just around $345 million.46 Donald
Trump and Michael Bloomberg each spent over $10 million for
about one minute of national advertising during the 2020 Super
Bowl.47 While no other advertising time comes near that cost,
broadcasting ads across the nation over multiple months of
primaries and general elections adds up fast.
What other costs does a campaign have? One such cost is advertising via social media and the web. While digital content—
excluding cable—is quickly growing in its relative importance in
elections, its reach remains more limited than television.48
Additionally, major network television—excluding news channels—consistently reaches a broad cross-section of the populace,
whereas people are far more likely to self-select webpages or
follow social media feeds on sites like Twitter that reinforce the
views they already hold.49 As such, social media may be a great
way to reinforce a message to your base via pages they are likely
to visit, but it is less effective at reaching a broader audience of
potential new supporters.50 Even more important, the relative
cost of internet-based advertising is small compared to television
advertising.51 With over $350 million spent on advertising
through the first month and a half of 2020, Bloomberg spent only

.com/2019/11/24/politics/michael-bloomberg-2020-election/index.html [https://perma
.cc/9VLR-D3D3].
46
Siegel & Kim, supra note 29; see also Shane Goldmacher, Michael Bloomberg
Spent More than $900 Million on His Failed Presidential Run, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/20/us/politics/bloomberg-campaign-900-million
.html [https://perma.cc/WM3Z-EKLY]; Expenditures Breakdown, Tom Steyer, 2020 Cycle, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/2020-presidential-race/expenditures
/tom-steyer?id=N00044966 [https://perma.cc/77VK-5QTR] (last visited May 20, 2021).
47
Nick Corasaniti, Bloomberg and Trump Buy Super Bowl Ads at $10 Million
Each, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/us/politics
/bloomberg-trump-super-bowl-ad.html [https://perma.cc/7DLJ-NWYZ].
48
Shereta Williams, Why Political Advertisers Double Down on Local TV and
What Brand Media Pros Can Learn from Them, MEDIAPOST (Jan. 8, 2020), https://
www.mediapost.com/publications/article/345329/why-political-advertisers-double-downon-local-tv.html [https://perma.cc/R65R-GEW9].
49
Wood & Ravel, supra note 10, at 1270; see also Ari Lightman, On TV, Political
Ads Are Regulated—but Online, Anything Goes, THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 21, 2019,
3:16 PM), http://theconversation.com/on-tv-political-ads-are-regulated-but-onlineanything-goes-126553 [https://perma.cc/5KQZ-J95U].
50
See Erika Franklin Fowler et al., Political Advertising Online and Offline, 114
AM. POL. SCI. R. 1, 1–2 (2020).
51
Id. at 2.
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$31 million of that on Facebook advertising.52 However, digital’s
share is growing, with 2020 expected to reach 20% of total
spending, compared with almost 75% for television.53 Digital
advertising spending grew 789% from 2012 to 2016, where it
reached $1.4 billion.54 Digital spending topped $2.1 billion in the
2020 elections.55 Social media pages created by a candidate or by
supporters cost little for global reach.56 Similarly, social media
posts can be handled by a few volunteers, but even if a few people
are paid to perform such tasks, such expenses are trivial
compared to television advertising costs. Even buying ads online
is much cheaper than buying ads on television.57 One thirtysecond ad during the show This Is Us cost about $434,000 in
2018, whereas a Facebook ad running for months could cost a
fraction of that.58

52
See Jake Johnson, Mega-Billionaire Bloomberg’s $350 Million Ad Spending
Blitz Is ‘What Plutocracy Looks Like,’ COMMON DREAMS (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www
.commondreams.org/news/2020/02/11/mega-billionaire-bloombergs-350-million-adspending-blitz-what-plutocracy-looks [https://perma.cc/73X8-RY6M]; Kaelan Deese,
Bloomberg Has Spent $1 Million a Day on Facebook Ads in the past Two Weeks,
Surpassing Trump, THE HILL (Feb. 12, 2020, 1:53 PM), https://thehill.com
/homenews/campaign/482770-bloomberg-has-spent-1-million-a-day-on-facebook-ads-inlast-two-weeks [https://perma.cc/E7LQ-973Z]. Facebook and Google are the two most
popular digital advertising platforms in the United States, with Facebook receiving
about twice the level of political spending as Google gets. Anna Massoglia & Karl
Evers-Hillstrom, 2020 Presidential Candidates Top $100M in Digital Ad Spending
as Twitter Goes Dark, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Nov. 14, 2019, 2:08 PM), https://www
.opensecrets.org/news/2019/11/digital-ad-spending-2020-presidential-candidates-top100m/ [https://perma.cc/PPW9-MMBD].
53
Nicole Perrin, Political Ad Spending to Reach $6 Billion for 2020 Election,
EMARKETER (July 19, 2019), https://www.emarketer.com/content/political-ad-spendto-reach-6-billion-for-2020-election [https://perma.cc/2LF9-RFHJ]; Joe Mandese, 2020
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MEDIADAILYNEWS (June 27, 2019), https://www.mediapost.com/publications
/article/337563/2020-political-spending-to-hit-6-billion-digital.html [https://perma.cc
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Online Political Ad Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG (June 11, 2021), https://www
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Spending Projections, supra note 25.
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Radio spending is comparatively minor, with total expenditures for the 2016 election cycle totaling $621 million.59 Likewise, direct mail is comparatively insignificant, totaling just $301
million in 2016.60 Yard signs have an even more limited reach
and also add little to overall campaign costs.61
When one considers super PAC expenditures, the cost breakdowns become even more lopsided. Without the need for onground staff that a campaign requires, super PACs expend
essentially all their funds on advertising, with the majority of
that being spent on television.62
Due to the need to spend monumental amounts on television
and digital advertising, candidates have only two options: be rich
or spend a significant amount of time raising money for the next
campaign.63 For many, there is obviously no choice: the only
option is to raise lots of cash. Even for the rich, a major senatorial
or presidential run will cost far more than most candidates are
willing to part with from their own funds.64 With that being said,
the effects of each of these options can be readily observed.
The first effect of the need for massive funds is how it
impacts the ability of people who are not rich to run for major
office. In the early stages of the 2020 presidential race, three
candidates were billionaires, and as many as another twenty-two
were millionaires.65 It is likely that only one of the major
59

Kaye, supra note 28.
Id.
61
Philip Bump, Sorry Campaign Managers: Lawn Signs Are Only 98.3 Percent
Useless, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2015, 11:33 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/the-fix/wp/2015/12/29/sorry-campaign-managers-lawn-signs-are-only-98-3-percentuseless [https://perma.cc/KC5U-M7DQ].
62
Prokop, supra note 33.
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Daniel P. Valentine, Comment, November Madness: A Proposal for Representative Democracy Brackets to Eliminate the Undue Influence of Money on Elections, 4
TEX. A&M L. REV. 137, 141–42 (2016).
64
See How Much Does It Cost To Become President?, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 31,
2020), https://www.investopedia.com/insights/cost-of-becoming-president [https://perma
.cc/46PH-5ZT4]; Julia Glum, All the Senators Running for Re-Election in the 2018
Midterms, Ranked by How Much They’re Spending to Keep Their Jobs, MONEY (Nov.
2, 2018, 12:39 PM), https://money.com/all-the-senators-running-for-reelection-in-the2018-midterms-ranked-by-how-much-theyre-spending-to-keep-their-jobs [https://perma
.cc/Y6G2-VA8D].
65
Net Worth of 2020 Presidential Candidates, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www
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competitive contenders was not at least a millionaire, and of the
last eleven Democratic candidates in the race, it is likely only two
of them were not millionaires while they were running.66 Even at
the congressional level, 40% of elected officials are millionaires.67
By comparison, in 2018 only 6.21% of American households had a
net worth over a million dollars,68 although this number has
grown significantly in recent years given the steady growth in
the stock market since 2009.69 As was previously discussed, if
only the rich can successfully run for office, democracy is eroded
by disenfranchising the voice of the middle and lower classes.70
More directly and importantly, all but the very richest must
raise massive amounts of money to run for office. Raising money
consumes a significant amount of a politician’s time.71 In practice,
politicians raise a significant percentage of their campaign funds
from major donors, given their access to large sums of money: in
the 2018 midterms, only 0.47% of the population gave $200 or
more to political campaigns, yet such contributions accounted for
71% of the money contributed toward the election.72 Given the

chael Bloomberg, FORBES https://www.forbes.com/profile/michael-bloomberg [https://
perma.cc/8TF3-36MY] (last visited May 20, 2021); Justin Wingerter, John
Hickenlooper Files Financial Disclosure Form Showing Net Worth Is at Least $9M,
THE DENVER POST (Dec. 20, 2019, 6:41 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2019
/12/20/john-hickenlooper-financial-disclosure-net-worth/ [https://perma.cc/Z8EY-XWP2].
66
Of former Vice President Joe Biden, Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren, Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, Minnesota Senator Amy Klobuchar, and
South Bend Mayor Pete Buttigieg, only Buttigieg was known not to be a millionaire.
Net Worth of 2020 Presidential Candidates, supra note 65; Alexander et al., supra
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Frank, U.S. Added 700,000 New Millionaires in 2017, CNBC (Mar. 22, 2018, 6:00
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/21/us-added-700000-new-millionaires-in-2017.html
[https://perma.cc/R4QD-EA8Y].
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See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
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the House Democratic Plan?, WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www
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limits on individual contributions that can be made directly to
candidates, such fundraising often takes the form of
contributions to super PACs formed to act on behalf of a specific
candidate.73 Two-thirds of donations to super PACs were over $1
million.74 Regardless of whether a contribution goes directly to a
candidate’s campaign or a super PAC, its corrosive effect on
democracy is the same.
The practical effect of having to raise significant funds from
mega-donors is that once a politician is elected, she feels beholden to her major donors, and therefore feels pressure to promote
laws and policies favored by them.75 If this pressure were not
effective in influencing which policies a politician promotes,
mega-donors would not keep giving—they demand a return on
their investment. There is a clear and demonstrable correlation
between a politician’s positions to those of her major donors.76
Additionally, the prospect of a major donation provides access to
the politician, allowing a mega-donor to pitch her agenda directly
to the candidate.77 The combined effects of needing money from
mega-donors—knowing what these donors desire and knowing
they will give only if a politician pursues their goals—corrupts
democracy by diluting the influence of the overwhelming
majority of voters.78
B.

Misinformation’s Effects on Elections

In the not too distant past, most Americans agreed on what
was going on in the world—on the “facts.”79 But the world has
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changed,80 and as a society we are no longer able to agree on
what the facts are.81 We live in an era where there are conservative and liberal news stations and a virtually uncountable number
of partisan news sources online.82 As such, most people now selfselect into news sources that reflect their political predispositions.83 Additionally, with the advent of twenty-four hour news
networks, these networks need to fill the broadcasting day, and
people just are not going to watch the same stories repeatedly for
extended periods. As such, much of the programming has evolved
into commentary or opinion-based shows that reflect the political
orientation of the network and its viewers.84 Some of these
programs significantly distort the truth, and even misrepresent it
on a recurring basis.85 While there is nothing wrong per se with
political commentary shows or websites, they run a substantial
risk of confusing their viewers as to what is fact and what is
opinion,86 especially when airing on a news network or when a
news ticker tape is scrolling across the screen. Not surprisingly,
everyone has noticed that the “news” being reported is not the
same on the various networks, which has led an increasing number of people to believe that they just cannot trust the news or

80
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83
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/445385-journalism-is-now-opinion-based-not-news-based [https://perma.cc/G5PGQCLF].
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that the news others listen to is “fake news.”87 This feedback loop
further erodes any sense that there is any truth beyond one’s
preexisting biases and creates a major barrier to informing the
electorate adequately.
There is an old joke that asks: “How do you know when a
politician is lying?” The answer being: “His lips are moving.”
This adage reflects the view that politicians lie regularly, both
currently and historically. However, things seem to have gotten
worse. Previously, there appeared to be some minimal level of
shame that even politicians possessed that constrained just how
far they would go in bending the truth. America now lives in a
post-shame era88 with “alternative facts,” where politicians will
blatantly lie about observable or verifiable truths—misrepresenting their positions and those of their opponents.89 They will
say they have never said something even though there is videotape of them saying it,90 and increasingly, they will post doctored
photographs and videos.91 These lies may come in the form of
reported statements or political advertising.
87
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What kind of accountability is there for this lying? The sad
answer is, almost none. Political speech is the most important of
all of the types of free speech our Constitution protects.92 The
stakes involved here are so high that the courts are reluctant to
even consider holding politicians accountable for their lies, out of
fear that any limitations in this area could easily be perverted
into state suppression of dissent.93 While this is a real and
critical concern, the practical effect is that for a politician with no
shame, there is virtually no pressure to tell the truth.94 And
there is no legal accountability for false or misleading statements.95 Thus, any lie told in a political advertisement is unlikely to have any negative legal consequences for the speaker. Not
only is the person running the commercial unlikely to face any
personal consequences, the advertisement—and the lies within
it—can continue to run and spread disinformation. Furthermore,
when the news networks report on what a politician has said, the
report is filtered through the bias of the network or host. The
networks aligned with the general political orientation of the
speaker will typically ignore or downplay any lies, and those with
a different orientation will point out untruths.96
While this facially creates the opportunity for accountability
and repercussions when a politician lies, these hopes fail in the
face of the realities of our current political and information
ecosystem. With a two-party system close to being evenly split in
electoral support,97 pressure on a politician to change her behavior must come not only from the opposition but also from her
own supporters. While one would expect a certain amount of
/EX98-7VZL]; David Frum, The Very Real Threat of Trump’s Deepfake, THE
ATLANTIC (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04
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92
Victoria L. Killion, The First Amendment: Categories of Speech, CONG. RSCH.
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/59XB-Q68C].
93
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Sharockman, supra note 85; Illing, supra note 85.
97
Looking at presidential elections, voter totals are usually relatively close,
showing the split in support the two-party system creates. See Colton Carpenter,
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deference or forgiveness from one’s supporters, this is generally
not unlimited. For some, certain types of behavior—if known—
will be unacceptable and will cause a supporter to cease her
support. And for almost everyone, support will be withdrawn if a
politician actively pursues laws and policies contrary to one’s
important preferences. However, most Americans receive their
information from news sources that reflect their own biases, and
those sources increasingly tend to minimize misbehavior by
politicians they align with.98 Politicians are increasingly unlikely
to get pushback from their supporters, which is essential for
accountability.
When one considers super PACs, and the enormous amounts
they spend on political advertising, the situation is even worse.
Like politicians themselves,99 there is virtually no accountability
for inaccuracies in their advertisements, since we place such a
high value on allowing unfettered and unaccountable political
speech.100 Compounding the problem is the manner in which we
regulate super PACs. One of the reasons super PACs are allowed
to spend unlimited amounts on a candidate’s behalf is that they
are prohibited from coordinating with the candidate.101 While at
first glance this may seem like a good way to keep politicians
from being “bought” by big-money interest groups, it fails to keep
money from corrupting the process102 and creates less accountability for the spread of disinformation. As has been well documented, politicians provide access to lobbyists and mega-donors,
and can still be beholden when mega-donors contribute to super
PACs.103 Both by meeting with these people to hear their agendas
and through passive communication from a candidate about her
general campaigning preferences, the lobbyist is able to make her
positions known to the politician, and the politician is able to
have a high degree of confidence that the super PACs supporting
her will generally act in a manner the candidate supports.104
However, since the politician and the super PAC are officially
precluded from coordinating, the advertisements run by the
super PAC can be even less truthful and more misleading than

98
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those run by the politician herself. The lack of coordination
essentially provides a shield against the politician being blamed
for the content of super PAC advertisements, no matter how
egregious.105 Not surprisingly, the sleaziest political ads are
almost always from super PACs; these ads further spread
misinformation to the detriment of a healthy democracy.106
Of course, there are other actors out there creating and
spreading disinformation. With the relatively low cost of creating
websites and of disseminating information through social media
platforms,107 it should come as no surprise that there is a significant number of independent actors with strongly held political
views that create and post false or misleading information.108
This misinformation is then shared by misled consumers.109 In
the worst cases, these fabrications are picked up by news outlets110 or the politicians themselves,111 thereby amplifying their
105
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106
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spread. Even when this does not occur, it is easy for people to be
misled since voters often look for online information to validate
their pre-existing biases.112 The First Amendment’s protection of
political speech assumes that deceptions will be exposed in the
marketplace of ideas, but social media and the internet essentially bypass the marketplace by directly targeting those that
are receptive to their message.113 Further compounding this
problem are hostile foreign state actors. There is significant
evidence to support the conclusion that multiple foreign governments now create misinformation and disseminate it on a
widespread basis.114 With the resources and technology available
to them, these governments can have a significantly larger impact on the number of people misled by these campaigns than
individual rogue actors.115
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BROOKINGS (July 31, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/07/31
/combating-disinformation-and-foreign-interference-in-democracies-lessons-fromeurope/ [https://perma.cc/8YAH-AY55]; Korecki, supra note 108; Ina Fried, Human
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supra note 10.
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campaign was significant—thousands of Russian-backed human operatives and
automated bots created more than one million tweets and hundreds of thousands of
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Taken together, the compounded lies and misinformation
spread through these methods severely impact how well informed
voters are, and democracy cannot function properly with an
ignorant electorate.116 An increasing number of people just believe
what they choose to believe and disregard any information, no
matter how credible, that contradicts their position.117 In such an
echo chamber, properly informing voters becomes almost impossible. Good decisions on how to vote come from having quality
information about the candidates and their positions.118 The
current climate makes it hard for a candidate to clearly get her
message out and makes it likely that many voters will be
misled.119 In such a situation, it is hard for voters to know
enough to vote intelligently, and equally hard for them to hold
their leaders accountable.
C.

Technology’s Effects on Elections

Some of the disinformation problems described above are
directly attributable to the internet and social media, which
allow virtually anyone to have a worldwide platform easily and
at little cost. These problems are unlikely to be resolved in the
future, given current technology. Until quite recently,120 social
media platforms had done little to police the accuracy of the
content their users post, and have often aggressively resisted
efforts to make them do more.121 In some ways, this makes
sense—when billions of people can all write their own posts,
overseeing such a colossal amount of data is a herculean task,
without even considering the potentially chilling effects on free
speech. But even if the will were present in these companies to

Facebook and Instagram posts, while uploading more than 1,000 YouTube videos.
The tweets garnered 288 million views and the Facebook posts reached 126 million
US accounts.”).
116
Wood & Ravel, supra note 10, at 1234–37.
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See generally Napoli, supra note 83.
118
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Pandemic, WASH. POST (July 28, 2020, 6:18 PM), https://www.washingtonpost
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combat political disinformation, it would quickly devolve into the
world’s largest game of whack-a-mole.122 Given the ease of
creating and disseminating bogus digital content, foreign states
and rogue actors can quickly create new sources of disinformation any time a source is shut down or removed.123 Furthermore,
there are multiple platforms available, and many reside outside
of the United States’ jurisdiction—even though they are readily
accessible from American devices. Thus, foreign states and rogue
actors can easily create and disseminate bogus content outside
the reach of the American government’s power to regulate them
effectively.
To make matters worse, the ability to create fake content is
only growing. From the perspective of trying to have an informed
electorate, few things are scarier than the ever-increasing ability
to create “deep-fakes”—realistic photos and videos of people doing
or saying things that they never did or said.124 They say a picture
is worth a thousand words, and with good reason. Few things
are more powerfully persuasive in affecting one’s opinion than
seeing someone say or do something.125 The ability to create
these realistic fabrications will have devastating effects on how
misinformed voters will become in the future, and will only
exacerbate the mistrust of information that does not comport
with one’s biases.126 This impact is certain to be further amplified as politicians and news outlets re-transmit such content,
thereby giving it increased credibility to the viewer. In the last
year, we have seen several examples of high-level politicians and
their allies promoting a blatantly false message using this

122
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technology.127 While the quality of most of these materials,
particularly videos, makes it relatively easy to spot fabrications,
it will not be long before they become virtually indistinguishable
from real content. How is democracy to survive in an era where
it is so easy to completely deceive voters, especially when this
new wrinkle is stacked on top of all the other information
problems that democracy faces?
III. REGULATION OF POLITICAL SPEECH
Political speech has long been recognized as the most
important type of free speech there is.128 America is so concerned
about the risk of chilling or suppressing it that it essentially
chooses to err on the side of letting almost anything be said—
without accountability for its accuracy.
A.

First Amendment Limitations

Protection for free speech is enshrined in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which has been found to
protect the inviolability of the marketplace of ideas.129
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content . . . . To permit the
continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure
self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed
the right to express any thought, free from government
censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is content
control. Any restriction on expressive activity because of its
content would completely undercut the “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wi[d]e-open.”130

Based on well-developed jurisprudence, one’s freedom of
speech is generally presumed to be protected unless it falls
within the scope of one of the narrow exceptions that have been
recognized.131 Even then, our system strongly prefers to create
127
Cowan et al., supra note 91; Ghaffary, supra note 91; Ross, supra note 91;
Frum, supra note 91; see also Halpern, supra note 113.
128
Killion, supra note 92.
129
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971); see also Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010).
130
Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972) (quoting N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
131
Exceptions include, among other things, fighting words, inciting violence or
other imminent lawless action, obscenity, defamation, and breaches of national
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liability for unprotected speech rather than prohibiting it in the
first place.132 While defamation, or lying about someone else, is
generally an exception, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell133 reaffirmed
an actual malice standard for liability to public figures.134 Actual
malice is a high defamation bar for public figures; it makes their
likelihood of recovering remote.135 This standard creates a cause
of action for lies about fact, but statements of opinion are not
actionable regardless of how irrational a speaker’s opinion is.136
Thus, by merely couching a fabrication in the language of an
opinion, any potential liability is essentially removed due to the
difficulty of proving intent. Even though there is a clear difference between saying “Bob molests children” and “I believe Bob
molests children,” how likely is a voter to truly internalize that
difference while watching an advertisement? Further complicating matters, the time it takes to complete a lawsuit is almost
always longer than the length of a campaign. As such, an
opponent’s lies will be able to do their damage, and voters will
have voted with this misinformation circulating.137 When these
limitations are added to the risk of politicians harming their own
image by suing, and the fact that the only compensation is
monetary, it is not surprising that defamation suits by politicians
are rare.138
While the details are beyond the scope of this Article, it must
be noted that the standard of review for regulations on speech
varies depending on the type of speech involved. For example,

security. See Erwin Chemerinsky, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES
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134
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disregard for the truth. See id. at 49–50; Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80; Richman,
supra note 18, at 676.
135
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occur. But even when they do, they rarely succeed. See Richman, supra note 18, at
677–78.
136
Epps, supra note 3 (explaining that “[p]ublic persons can’t collect without
showing a false statement of fact”).
137
See Chris Weller, Here’s Why Trump Can Legally Get Away with Saying
Things That Aren’t True, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 28, 2016, 12:14 PM), https://www
.businessinsider.com/why-politicians-dont-get-sued-over-ads-2016-11 [https://perma
.cc/5VBC-KV58]; Brooks Jackson, Suing over False Political Advertising,
FACTCHECK.ORG (Feb. 7, 2008), https://www.factcheck.org/2008/02/suing-over-falsepolitical-advertising/ [https://perma.cc/97VG-MR54].
138
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the standards for regulating commercial speech are lower than
those for political speech.139 Government regulations on political
speech must meet a strict scrutiny standard of review by showing
(1) a compelling state interest for such regulation, (2) that the
regulation is narrowly tailored to meet such purpose, and (3) that
the method chosen to achieve such purpose is the least restrictive
means available.140 This high standard has routinely led to the
invalidation of statutory attempts to place restrictions on political advertisements.
In Citizens United v. FEC, one of the most important recent
cases on regulating political speech, the Supreme Court of the
United States applied strict scrutiny to rules promulgated by the
Federal Elections Commission (“FEC”) that limited the ability of
corporations and unions to spend money in support of candidates.141 FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.142 had previously
made clear that the FEC cannot prohibit third parties from
political advertising, provided the advertising does not advocate
directly for or against a candidate, which set the stage for dark
money contributions through 501(c)(4) entities.143 The Court
went further in Citizens United; the rules at issue there failed
the strict scrutiny test because the Court found no compelling
governmental interest in limiting political speech by corporations
in preventing “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”144
The Court also effectively held that money was the equivalent of speech, stating “[a]ll speakers, including individuals and
the media, use money amassed from the economic marketplace to
fund their speech. The First Amendment protects the resulting
139
See Killion, supra note 92; see also R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern
Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny, Intermediate Review, and “Reasonableness”
Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 370 (2016) (providing an overview of free speech
regulation).
140
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Products Co. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Killion, supra note 92; Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2418 (1996); Wood & Ravel, supra note 10, at 1238–44.
141
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143
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144
558 U.S. at 348 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652, 660
(1990)).
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speech . . . .”145 One of the arguments put forth in support of the
campaign-spending limitation was to limit the corrupting influence of money on politics, out of a concern that the need for
campaign funding could lead politicians to engage in a quid pro
quo with a big-money donor.146 While the Court previously
deemed the anti-corruption interest sufficiently important to
allow contribution limits,147 the Court was unwilling to extend
this reasoning to direct expenditures made by persons, including
corporations, in support of or in opposition to a candidate.148
Justice Kennedy indicated that acceptable limitations on campaign spending are “limited to [those targeting] quid pro quo
corruption,” which the majority defined as “dollars for political
favors,” not mere favoritism or access.149 This was subsequently
clarified as “captur[ing] the notion of a direct exchange of an
official act for money.”150 In essence, to limit such expenditures
of money is to muzzle speech, and concerns about corruption
could be met through more narrowly tailored policies like disclosure requirements.
Based on this holding, the super PAC was born, allowing
unlimited contributions and expenditures during election cycles,
provided that the super PAC does not coordinate with the
candidate that it advocates for.151 Another argument rejected by
the Court was that corporations are spending money that ultimately belongs to its owners—the shareholders—and that the
government should be able to regulate corporate expenditures to
protect dissenting shareholders from being forced to fund
political speech they may disagree with.152
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Federal Trade Commission Limits on Advertising

The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) regulates advertising and generally requires advertisements to be accurate and
truthful.153 However, there is a major exception for political
advertisements. Under Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, broadcast television networks are prohibited
from blocking political advertisements from a candidate based on
their content.154 By its terms, this limitation applies only to
broadcast networks, but cable television companies largely
adhere to it as well.155 And although, based on the wording of the
statute, it does not apply to advertising by outside groups such as
PACs and super PACs, networks remain hesitant to block such
content in all but the most extreme cases.156 Thus, surprisingly,
the law requires more truth in advertising for a hamburger than
in critically important political advertising.157
C.

Federal Election Law Limitations

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 limits the
amount that donors can give to political campaigns.158 However,
the government may not cap the total amount a campaign may
spend on an election.159 The individual donation limits are based
both on who is making the donation and who will receive the
donation.160 For example, in 2020, an individual can give up to
$2,800 to a candidate, $5,000 to a PAC, $10,000 to a non-national
153
Truth in Advertising, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events
/media-resources/truth-advertising [https://perma.cc/ZHM7-EMWJ] (last visited May
31, 2021).
154
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155
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party committee, and $35,500 to a national party committee per
election.161 On the other hand, a national party committee can
give $5,000 to a candidate and $5,000 to a PAC, but has no limits
on transfers to party committees.162 After McCutcheon v. FEC,
caps on total combined contributions to all candidates a person
wishes to support are prohibited.163
More importantly, given Citizens United, there are no limits
on contributions to super PACs.164 Thus, the limitations are essentially meaningless, since anyone can give as much as they
want over the stated limits to a super PAC formed to support a
particular candidate.165 Over two-thirds of super PAC contributions are more than one million dollars,166 making a mockery of
the FEC limits on contributions to candidates. While candidates
and super PACs are technically barred from coordinating, it is
well understood that super PACs frequently choreograph their
activities with the campaigns they support, and many super
PACs are actually run by party leaders who carefully align their
spending with that of the party.167 Despite numerous potential
violations of this prohibition on coordination, the FEC has not
imposed a single penalty for such actions since Citizens United.168
While super PACs contain no limits on the amounts they can
spend on a candidate’s behalf, they must disclose who their
donors are.169 However, large-money donors often do not want
their identities revealed—especially if they are helping create
misleading advertisements. That is where non-profit advocacy
groups come into play. Groups that advocate on behalf of policy
issues that register as “social welfare” groups under 501(c)(4) of
the Internal Revenue Code may spend unlimited funds to create
161
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political advertisements about such issues without disclosing
who their donors are.170 Thus, an environmental or gun rights
group, for example, can create advocacy ads attacking or supporting a candidate based on her position on the issues of concern
to such group, with no amount limits and no disclosure of who its
donors are.171 This dark-money loophole also allows foreign
money to infiltrate American elections secretly, even though
foreign contributions are prohibited.172 These groups are often
referred to as “dark money” groups, since their donors are not
disclosed.173 It is difficult to know how much dark money is being
spent on political campaigns, since these groups do not have to
disclose all of their expenditures to the FEC.174 While it is known
that at least $1 billion in dark money has been spent on federal
elections since 2010, this figure likely represents a conservative
estimate.175 In the 2018 election cycle, approximately one-third
of all advertising from outside groups in senate races was bought
by dark money groups,176 and a majority of overall outside
spending was by dark-money sources or groups that take money
from such sources.177
Additionally, the FEC is charged with enforcing campaign
finance laws.178 One way it does this is by requiring candidates,
political parties, PACs and super PACs to disclose amounts
raised and spent on elections.179 Unfortunately, beyond this, the
FEC accomplishes very little.180 The commission is composed of
six members; no more than three are allowed from one political
170

Prokop, supra note 33; Evers-Hillstrom, supra note 24.
Such advertisements may be harshly critical of a candidate for her positions
but may not specifically advocate a vote for or against her. Prokop, supra note 33.
172
Evers-Hillstrom, supra note 24.
173
Prokop, supra note 33.
174
Id.
175
Daniel I. Weiner, Fixing the FEC: An Agenda for Reform, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST. 1 (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08
/Report_Fixing_FEC.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8CE-ND4C]; Prokop, supra note 33.
176
Fowler et al., supra note 40.
177
Evers-Hillstrom et al., supra note 36.
178
Federal Election Commission, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/federal-agencies
/federal-election-commission [https://perma.cc/CY49-EB36] (last visited June 3, 2021).
179
Zachary G. Parks & Kevin Glandon, FEC Issues New Guidance on Donor
Disclosure for Entities Making Independent Expenditures, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 5,
2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/fec-issues-new-guidance-donor-disclosureentities-making-independent-expenditures [https://perma.cc/6XR5-8KGR].
180
See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, F.E.C. Can’t Curb 2016 Election Abuse, Commission
Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/us
/politics/fec-cant-curb-2016-election-abuse-commission-chief-says.html [https://perma
.cc/2DLL-Z8NS]; Weiner, supra note 175, at 1–3.
171

2020]

FREE SPEECH HAS GOTTEN VERY EXPENSIVE

643

party.181 Thus, in practice, that means the commission is effectively paralyzed by gridlock.182 In 2015, FEC Chair Ann Ravel
said that “the likelihood of [campaign finance] laws being
enforced [was] slim” prior to the 2016 elections.183 Not surprisingly, enforcement actions have dropped significantly as a result
of the FEC’s gridlock: in 2006, the FEC assessed over $5.5
million in civil penalties, but this amount has consistently been
under one million dollars annually since 2009.184 Not surprisingly, enforcement actions have dropped significantly as a result. In
such an environment, the ability of the FEC to stop super PACs
from coordinating, in a practical if not literal sense, with
campaigns is almost non-existent.185 If these problems were not
enough, the FEC has been unable to function since September
2019 due to a lack of sufficient members to constitute a quorum,
resulting in over “300 cases on its . . . docket that cannot be
resolved.”186
D. The Internet and Social Media
With the 2020 election cycle getting into high gear, candidates and advocacy groups are poised to spend over $1.6 billion
on internet and social media advertising.187 However, there is
virtually no federal regulation covering these advertisements.188
181
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Digital advertising presents increased risks for our democracy,
with its ability to directly target groups with disinformation,
raising the need for appropriate controls.189 However, internet
platforms and social media are not considered broadcasters
subject to many of the current FEC rules.190 More and more
people have argued for the need for clear rules for regulating
political advertising on the web and social media.191 Realistically,
however, what are these calls for regulation likely to achieve?
Given the severe First Amendment limitations to regulating
content in television advertising,192 even a rigorous mapping of
television rules to digital platforms will result in all the same
limits and potential problems.
Furthermore, until quite recently, internet and social media
platforms seemed uninterested or unwilling to self-regulate
political advertisements.193 Even if such platforms were willing
to police the content posted, this raises several major concerns.
First, as is always the case with censoring political content, are
we comfortable as a society with a private company making such
determinations? How will the public know whether a platform is
biasing an election by being stricter in banning or allowing one
candidate’s content over another’s?194 Additionally, what liability
/IF10758 [https://perma.cc/73DS-V3WP]; Ed. Bd., Online Political Ads Are in Urgent
Need of Regulation, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/e0a93d3cfbd3-11e9-a354-36acbbb0d9b6 [https://perma.cc/MXY2-KWPF]; see generally Halpern,
supra note 113; Lightman, supra note 49.
189
Ed. Bd., supra note 188; see Wood & Ravel, supra note 10, at 1225, 1229–31;
see also Ed. Bd., supra note 113; Halpern, supra note 113.
190
Halpern, supra note 113; Karl Evers-Hillstrom, FEC Chair Makes Another
Go at Regulating Online Political Ads, OPENSECRETS.ORG (June 17, 2019, 4:04 PM),
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/06/fec-chair-takes-another-go-at-regulatingonline-ads/ [https://perma.cc/6QJU-SQP2].
191
Glazer & Haggin, supra note 186; Ed. Bd., supra note 113; Halpern, supra
note 113; Evers-Hillstrom, supra note 190.
192
See supra Section III.A.
193
Wood & Ravel, supra note 10, at 1244–47; Beyersdorf, supra note 10, at
1082–84; Gillespie, supra note 56; Glazer & Haggin, supra note 186. But see Lerman
et al., supra note 120 (discussing recent changes to social media companies’ laissez
faire approach).
194
The recent moves by the major social media platforms to police political misinformation have drawn significant criticism from conservatives claiming bias, with
President Trump issuing an executive order to try to prohibit their self-policing. See
James Wellemeyer, Conservatives Are Flocking to a New “Free Speech” Social Media
App That Has Started Banning Liberal Users, NBC NEWS (July 3, 2020, 12:13 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/conservatives-flock-free-speech-social-mediaapp-which-has-started-n1232844 [https://perma.cc/6UPW-6B95]; Shannon Bond,
Trump Accuses Social Media of Anti-Conservative Bias After Twitter Marks His
Tweets, NPR (May 27, 2020, 4:08 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/27/863422722
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would this form of self-regulation expose a platform to for
incorrectly identifying and blocking false or misleading content?
On another front, the United States’ national security
apparatus attempts to monitor and combat foreign government
attacks on our elections, including the dissemination of false and
misleading information via digital media.195 However, the low
cost of producing disinformation and the ability to quickly distribute it via multiple avenues limits the effectiveness of such
efforts.196 Additionally, these efforts are focused only on foreignbased disinformation, even though there is considerable domestically produced misinformation content.197 Furthermore, every
time an attack is thwarted, it is easily redirected back via
another webpage or portal.198 The country’s guardians lack sufficient resources to effectively combat these attacks.199
E.

For the People Act of 2019

In March of 2019, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved the For the People Act of 2019.200 Since then, the
bill has languished, awaiting action by the Senate, with no
progress to speak of since March 2019. This bill proposes a
number of changes to how the United States conducts elections
and is designed to improve our democracy; most of these pro/trump-accuses-social-media-of-anti-conservative-bias-after-twitter-marks-his-twe
[https://perma.cc/VF4B-4C62]; Brian Heater, Appeals Court Rules in Favor of
Google, Apple, Facebook and Twitter in Anti-Conservative Bias Suit, TECHCRUNCH
(May 27, 2020, 6:17 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/05/27/appeals-court-rules-infavor-of-google-apple-facebook-and-twitter-in-anti-conservative-bias-suit/ [https://perma
.cc/RG9J-LMYW]; Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020)
(addressing what President Trump calls anti-conservative bias from social media
companies). Furthermore, GOP state legislators have introduced bills in numerous
states that would allow social media platforms to be sued for political censorship.
Anthony Izaguirre, GOP Pushes Bills To Allow Social Media “Censorship” Lawsuits,
AP NEWS (March 7, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-legislature-medialawsuits-social-media-848c0189ff498377fbfde3f6f5678397 [https://perma.cc/YW9MLMHW].
195
Philip Ewing, What You Need to Know About Foreign Interference and the
2020 Election, NPR (Sept. 1, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/01
/737978684/what-you-need-to-know-about-foreign-interference-and-the-2020-election
[https://perma.cc/8VKL-QAD2].
196
See Fowler et al., supra note 50, at 1.
197
Levine et al., supra note 108.
198
Ortutay, supra note 122; Levine et al., supra note 108.
199
Max Boot & Max Bergmann, Defending America from Foreign Election
Interference, COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/report
/defending-america-foreign-election-interference [https://perma.cc/M6PC-7PJV].
200
For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019).
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posed reforms are beyond the scope of this Article.201 However,
several of its provisions impact matters that have been addressed. The bill expands disclosure rules for organizations
spending money during elections, for campaign advertisements
and for online platforms, and revises disclaimer requirements for
political advertising.202 It also expands the ban on foreign
nationals expending funds in United States elections, and repeals
the treasury regulation that allows 501(c)(4) organizations not to
disclose who their donors are.203 While these are all welcome
improvements, none of these changes fundamentally affect the
corrosive power of the need candidates have for vast sums of
money, nor most of the problems being caused by the growing
dissemination of misinformation to the electorate, largely due to
the limitations imposed by the First Amendment. Title V of the
bill would also create a program that would provide federal funds
matching six times the amount of eligible small-donor contributions to a candidate.204 This provision is designed to help offset
the massive amounts of funds being poured into campaigns by
super PACs, often from very few actual people, in an effort to
amplify the diluted voice of the average voter.205 While this is a
step toward offsetting the massive influence of big-donor money
on our political system, it does nothing to stem the tide of evergrowing need for more money to get elected.
F.

Honest Ads Act of 2019

In 2019, the Honest Ads Act was reintroduced in both the
House and Senate.206 While forward progress on this proposed
legislation seems unlikely at this time,207 the bill, if passed,
would update the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to
expand the current disclosure requirements regarding who has
201
See generally id. (including provisions to make Election Day a federal holiday, reforms to improve voter registration and voter access, limitations on removing
voters from voter rolls, the creation of non-partisan redistricting commissions,
various measures designed to enhance the security and integrity of elections, and a
number of new ethics rules).
202
Id. § 5001(2), (9)−(10).
203
Id. §§ 4101(a), 522(b)(1)−(b)(2).
204
Id. § 5001(2), (9)−(10); see also Kessler, supra note 72.
205
H.R. 1 § 5001 (9)−(10).
206
Honest Ads Act, S. 1356, 116th Cong. (2019); Honest Ads Act, H.R. 2592,
116th Cong. (2019); Zach Montellaro, The Honest Ads Act Returns, POLITICO (May 9,
2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-score/2019/05/09
/the-honest-ads-act-returns-615586 [https://perma.cc/38GM-FABW].
207
Montellaro, supra note 206.
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bought TV, print, and radio ads to the internet.208 It would also
require reasonable efforts by platforms to ensure that advertisements are not purchased by foreign governments, disclosure of
how advertisements were targeted, and the cost of those advertisements.209 While this act would help clarify digital advertising
regulation, such disclosures will do little to combat the deluge of
misinformation flooding online political advertising.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
With all of the problems that our current approach to regulating political speech allows or causes, how can the United
States change its approach to make democracy function better?
A.

Make Politicians and Other Political Advertisers Accountable
for Their Lies and Misinformation

Some have argued that current defamation laws, possibly
with some tweaking, could be better used to hold politicians and
others accountable when they lie or spread disinformation in
their advertisements.210 The risk of accountability would then
presumably lead to advertisers lying less, or at least to confining
their statements to matters that are less clearly and verifiably
false. If meaningful accountability were in place and advertisers
were so deterred, this would help solve the misinformation crisis
that the United States finds itself in. The good news is that defamation is well established as an exception to First Amendment
free speech rights, and there have been successful cases brought
in the area of political speech by defamed parties.211 However,
such an approach presents several conceptual difficulties and
raises other major risks that likely outweigh the potential
benefits of pursing this idea.
First, defamation law is directed at stopping one party from
lying about another, but it is poorly suited to dealing with
situations where a candidate is lying about herself. When a candidate lies about herself or her accomplishments, no one has been
defamed, so no one would have standing to sue for defamation.212

208
209
210
211
212

S. 1356 § 5(a); H.R. 2592 § 5(a); see generally Halpern, supra note 113.
S. 1356 §§ 8(2)(B)–(C)(i), 9; H.R. 2592 §§ 8(2)(B)–(C)(i), 9.
See, e.g., Richman, supra note 18, at 697.
Hasen, supra note 11, at 57–63.
Id. at 57.
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The second problem with the approach arises from the
current “actual malice” liability standard for defaming a public
figure.213 Having to show actual intent to spread an untruth, or
reckless disregard for the truth, has proven to be a difficult bar to
meet.214 However, lowering this standard for political figures
risks overbroad liability, and more importantly, a substantial
chilling effect on overall political speech if politicians constantly
had to live in fear of liability for false or inaccurate statements.215
The next obstacle this approach faces is determining which
statements are actionable. If a politician makes an unrealistic
promise—as politicians have done forever—does that count as a
prohibited lie? The answer should be no. Promises of future
action are, at the time made, non-actionable because no one can
know what a politician will do until after being elected. And
even then, circumstances and opinions can change. Putting aside
such an easy example, what about misstatements of verifiable
facts as opposed to statements of opinion? This has a certain
appeal, given that a similar distinction already exists in other
areas of law. Pursuant to Article 2 of the UCC, statements of
fact regarding goods being sold must be true to avoid breaching
an express warranty.216 But statements of opinion, or “puffing,”
are not actionable.217 Unfortunately, politicians are masters at
parsing speech. If falsely saying your opponent is a sexual predator is actionable, but disingenuously saying you believe your
opponent is a sexual predator is not, political ads will quickly
shift their language when spreading disinformation to present
such lies as subtly stated opinions.
A further obstacle that must be overcome is determining who
gets to decide whether an advertisement creates liability. Since
this is an issue of liability for defamatory actions that have
already occurred, the obvious choice for enforcement would be the
court system, to ensure due process requirements are met.
Unfortunately, the court process moves slowly, and as a result
any ruling would be unlikely to occur prior to voting. As such, a

213

See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); Richman, supra
note 18, at 676.
214
See Hasen, supra note 11, at 57–63; see also Richman, supra note 18, at 675–
80.
215
See Hasen, supra note 11, at 74–77.
216
See U.C.C. § 2-313 (Westlaw 2019) (governing express warranties).
217
Id.
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party that chooses to lie may well find the lie effective in getting
the person elected despite risking liability.218
Compounding this problem is the issue of what type of
liability would attach to such conduct.219 If the only remedy is a
fine or monetary damages, the lying candidate still gains office
and the court award merely becomes another cost of getting
elected—a cost that is ultimately a drop in the bucket to a major
campaign. Of course, one could consider other types of remedies:
incarceration, loss of office, or enjoining the advertisement. But
each of these options carries other potential problems. In the
highly divided and partisan society in which the United States
now finds itself, few should be comfortable jailing candidates for
false advertising. Such a remedy is also potentially excessive.
Would one false advertisement or claim about an opponent be
enough, or would the conduct need to be pervasive? Such a
possibility would encourage overuse of the courts as a way to
potentially remove an opponent. Given the fine line that often
exists between facts and opinions, and the central importance of
political speech to a healthy democracy, such a major consequence for a misstep would have a major chilling effect on
political speech. Generally, the only nations that imprison politicians for “lying” about their opponents are dictatorships, which
use incarceration to suppress dissent and incapacitate opposition.220 Loss of office is certainly a lesser penalty than incarceration, but if a single lie could result in ineligibility, would any
candidate qualify? In the course of a campaign, lies will almost
always occur, and so would post-election lawsuits from losing
candidates trying to disqualify victorious opponents.
Enjoining a misleading ad from running seems like a more
balanced potential remedy—it stops the misinformation from
being disseminated without reducing the remedy to a mere cost
of getting elected or over-penalizing the act. But banning advertisements with falsehoods presents its own set of problems,
which are discussed in the next Section.

218

Weller, supra note 137; Jackson, supra note 137.
See Hasen, supra note 11, at 57–64 (providing a more in-depth discussion of
these concerns).
220
See generally Daniel Funke & Daniela Flamini, A Guide to AntiMisinformation Actions Around the World, POYNTER, https://www.poynter.org/ifcn
/anti-misinformation-actions/ [https://perma.cc/WF2A-SRRM] (last visited June 7,
2021) (compiling information on anti-misinformation actions taken by different
national governments around the world).
219
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More broadly, any attempt to create additional accountability for spreading political disinformation faces a major
jurisdictional limitation: enforcement actions against advertisements on foreign-based digital platforms would be difficult to
pursue, as it would be unlikely for the rogue actors to subject
themselves to the United States’ court system.
Finally, any accountability-based regime would, at most,
help mitigate the spread of disinformation. It would do nothing
to stem the meteoric growth of campaign spending and all of its
attendant problems.
B.

Ban Misleading and Factually Incorrect Political Advertising

Another possibility is to ban political advertising that is misleading or factually incorrect. The European Union, and in
particular Germany, has begun heading down this avenue with
significant fines for failure to remove false or misleading content
upon notice to do so.221 This approach could take one of two
forms: advertisements could require pre-approval before publication, or disseminated content that is flagged as potentially false
could be investigated and then ordered removed if falsity is
confirmed. The second approach appears to fit nicely within the
current FTC prohibition on, and enforcement mechanisms for,
false and misleading advertising222 applicable to non-political
advertising.
The benefit of either approach is that false and misleading
information would be removed. The concerns raised by both of
these possibilities are largely the same, but with two exceptions.
First, pre-approval would require every ad to be reviewed,
whereas flagging potentially problematic ads would require
review only of those flagged. In the highly politicized environment we now live in, this may result in little actual difference. If
viewers are allowed to flag potentially violating content, trolls
will likely flag virtually everything.223 However, if this does not

221

Nunziato, supra note 4, at 1531–38.
Truth in Advertising, supra note 153.
223
See generally Yuen Yiu, Battling Online Bots, Trolls and People, INSIDE
SCIENCE (Aug. 31, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://www.insidescience.org/news/battlingonline-bots-trolls-and-people [https://perma.cc/SYN8-FM3D] (focusing on issues that
bots and trolls create regarding American politics); see also Darrell M. West, How to
Combat Fake News and Disinformation, BROOKINGS (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www
.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/ [https://perma
.cc/W76D-CP7U] (discussing the presence of false accounts that exist for malevolent
222
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occur, a flagging-based approach should have fewer transactional
costs and thus be administratively cheaper. On the other hand, a
flagging-based approach allows disinformation to disseminate
and influence people before it is dealt with.
Overall, however, these minor differences pale in comparison
to the more significant concerns raised by banning false and
misleading political advertising. First, such a ban runs afoul of
the parameters set out by the Supreme Court for political
speech.224 The Court has held that good and bad political ideas—
false and true ones—are to battle it out in the marketplace of
ideas, with the belief that this process will allow the truth to
prevail.225 Ignoring the naivete of this historic view in an era of
misleading ads directly targeted at those most likely to be affected by them,226 any ban on political speech will have to survive
a strict scrutiny review. Even if preventing political misinformation in the digital age rises to the level of a compelling state
interest, a ban is unlikely to meet the requirement of being
narrowly tailored, and most certainly is not the least restrictive
option available. Obviously, a system that required labelling of
advertisements as potentially false or misleading to put consumers on notice would be less restrictive than a ban.227
Furthermore, such an approach poses significant risks to a
democracy.228 Who makes the final decision on which ads get to
run and which ones are banned? Letting the government decide
this matter potentially allows the party in power to favor its own
candidates or disadvantage others.229 Even a bipartisan commission runs the risk of lopsided quorums that lead to a similar
result. If an even number from both major parties are required

purposes); How Is Fake News Spread?, supra note 109 (explaining that bots and
trolls exist, in part, to perpetuate misinformation on the internet).
224
Nunziato, supra note 4, at 1537; Epps, supra note 3; Casey Newton, Why
Facebook Can’t Stop Politicians from Lying, THE VERGE (Oct. 19, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/interface/2019/10/9/20904516/facebook-political-ad-liesregulation [https://perma.cc/G2LL-4JZ2].
225
Nunziato, supra note 4, at 1520, 1524–27.
226
See generally Ed. Bd., supra note 188; see also Lightman, supra note 49; Ed.
Bd., supra note 113; Wood & Ravel, supra note 10, at 1225, 1227.
227
See infra Section IV.G (discussing this alternative).
228
See Nunziato, supra note 4, at 1531–38 (discussing some of the problems that
this approach has caused in the European Union, and, more specifically, showing
that the EU approach has placed a significant burden on platforms operating in
Europe while also emboldening supporters of controversial “opinion martyrs” whose
hateful content has been censored).
229
Hasen, supra note 11, at 56, 64.
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to ban an ad, the practical effect is likely to be gridlock, with few
if any ads being blocked, since neither side will want to vote
against its candidates.230 Additionally, a bipartisan commission
runs a meaningful risk of stifling third-party candidates, since
none of its members would care about protecting ads by them.
Handing decision-making over to the courts appears better
on its face, given the supposed independence of the judiciary, but
the court system is ill-equipped to process such cases in a timely
manner.231 And in this hyper-partisan age, it is more likely just
to cause further politicization of the courts and further mistrust
of the judiciary by the public. Given these concerns, it is not surprising that few major democracies have embraced this option.232
The nations that allow such bans are almost exclusively totalitarian and use this power to suppress dissent.
Finally, the FCC has little ability to reach foreign actors.
While the FCC can coopt United States–based broadcast networks and digital platforms into helping it police such a policy,
its ability to do so for platforms based outside the United States
is practically nonexistent.233 Thus banning politically misleading
advertising would allow foreign-based disinformation to coexist
next to domestic content that met truthfulness standards. In
such a situation, people might actually be more inclined to
believe both types of content than they would be now, where no
political advertising has an imprimatur of legitimacy based on
passing a truth-based filtering process. Of course, foreign election interference is already prohibited, and the national security
apparatus already works to combat foreign misinformation.234
230
This phenomenon can already be seen in the FEC’s gridlock difficulties. See
supra notes 178–186 and accompanying text.
231
See generally Weller, supra note 137; Jackson, supra note 137.
232
See generally Funke & Flamini, supra note 220.
233
Even clear prohibitions on activity that is not speech itself but directly
impacts political speech will have extraterritorial limitations, assuming they can
pass constitutional muster. For example, Ireland has proposed a law that makes it a
criminal offense to create multiple fake online accounts where one poses as different
people and spreads political messages. While this could likely survive a
constitutional challenge, since it merely prescribes that one cannot disseminate
speech through multiple fake accounts, the ability to find and prosecute any such
parties who are foreign actors is quite low. See Online Advertising and Social Media
(Transparency) Bill 2017 (Act No. 150/2017) (Ir.), https://data.oireachtas.ie/ie
/oireachtas/bill/2017/150/eng/initiated/b15017d.pdf [https://perma.cc/R96B-YMK2].
234
52 U.S.C. § 30121 (2018); see, e.g., Combating Foreign Influence, FBI,
https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/foreign-influence [https://perma.cc
/W2HX-G35P] (last visited June 7, 2021) (stating that “[t]he FBI is . . . responsible
for investigating foreign influence operations” that “spread disinformation” directed
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But as has been noted, the ease with which foreign actors can
create new portals for dissemination and the limited resources of
the United States’ cybersecurity apparatus makes this a neverending game of whack-a-mole with bad data perpetually leaking
through.235
C.

Publicly Funded Campaigns

Support for publicly funded campaigns has gained traction
recently, as evidenced by its inclusion in the For the People Act of
2019.236 However, this idea is less grandiose than it first appears.
Given the holding in Citizens United—that the government
cannot limit direct expenditures by people on behalf of political
causes or politicians they support237—these proposals rarely
suggest eliminating private funding, but rather suggest providing a level of public funding to candidates via matching funds for
contributions that candidate receives.238 Furthermore, the Court’s
ruling in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett prohibits using escalating matching funds, so a publicly
funded option could not be structured to directly offset amounts
spent by a candidate’s opponent and her supporters.239 As such,
these proposals, by themselves, would do nothing to combat
misinformation and do little to stem the corrosive effects of
money on politics. While having such funds available might
allow some politicians to be less beholden to big-money donors
and allow more non-wealthy candidates to successfully run for
office, it would throw more money into the advertising arms race,
and many politicians would still deem it advantageous to raise
larger amounts from major donors.

against the United States); Global Engagement Center: Core Mission & Vision, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-publicdiplomacy-and-public-affairs/global-engagement-center/ [https://perma.cc/3UDZ-DMBL]
(last visited June 7, 2021) (describing the State Department’s Global Engagement
Center, whose mission is to “recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign
state and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining or
influencing . . . the United States”).
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See supra Section II.C; Ortutay, supra note 122.
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For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. § 5211 (2019).
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Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371–72 (2010).
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See, e.g., H.R. 1 § 5201(a)(1)(A) (proposing that the federal government
provide six times the amount a candidate receives in small-money campaign
contributions).
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Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 754–55
(2011).
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D. Digital Platform Self-Regulation
With the exception of Twitter, which due to its structure
generates little in the way of advertising content,240 most digital
platforms had shown little interest in monitoring or regulating
political advertising prior to 2020.241 However, with rampant
misinformation being spread via social media in the run-up to
the 2020 election, several of the major social media platforms
have begun labeling content as misleading or removing it
outright.242 One advantage of this approach is that it can be
likely be done without running afoul of the First Amendment. As
private companies, digital platforms are not government actors,
and therefore are generally allowed to regulate speech as they
wish.243 Furthermore, as the parties hosting the content, they
are in the best position to monitor and control content on their
platforms.
If these and other social media platforms decide to continue
pursuing this approach, it raises other significant concerns,
however.244 Each company can, and will, set its own policies. At
a minimum, this creates inconsistencies and the possibility of
confusion, making it harder for people to know which content has
been vetted or filtered and which has not. Potentially more
disturbingly, as private citizens, there is no legal prohibition
against a platform favoring certain views or candidates over
others, thereby creating more disinformation.245 While the desire
to have broad market appeal may discourage some companies
from heading in this direction, television networks like Fox News
and MSNBC indicate a viable market for information providers
240
Katie Snyder, Twitter’s Decision to Ban Political Ads: Violation of First
Amendment Rights?, U. RICH. J.L. & TECH. BLOG (Nov. 19, 2019), https://jolt.richmond
.edu/2019/11/19/twitters-decision-to-ban-political-ads-violation-of-first-amendmentrights [https://perma.cc/CVS2-MQSZ] (noting that Twitter’s platform differs from
Facebook’s, since advertisements on Twitter are not as popular or common);
Gillespie, supra note 56.
241
Wood & Ravel, supra note 10, at 1244–46; see generally Beyersdorf, supra
note 10; Gillespie, supra note 56.
242
See generally, Lerman et al., supra note 120.
243
Nunziato, supra note 4, at 1522; Jessica Melugin, Twitter’s Ban on Political
Ads Has No First Amendment Implications, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (Oct. 31,
2019), https://cei.org/blog/twitters-ban-political-ads-has-no-first-amendment-implications
[https://perma.cc/F6QD-2J2V]; Heater, supra note 194.
244
See Wood & Ravel, supra note 10, at 1244–46 (offering a more detailed
discussion of some of these problems).
245
As has been noted, conservatives are already complaining about bias from
traditional social media platforms and are encouraging a migration to a conservative
platform. See Wellemeyer, supra note 194.
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with a clear political leaning. That said, broadcast networks
require a license from the FCC that places certain limits on their
ability to discriminate in accepting advertising—candidates for
federal office must be provided with reasonable access to
advertising opportunities.246 Thus, current proposals to extend
broadcast rules to digital media could help minimize platform
bias. But although this may help solve the concern with bias
domestically, it would have little impact extraterritorially. Furthermore, the misinformation problems present with the handsoff broadcast regulation system would be equally present in the
digital arena—especially with the constitutional limitations
present.247 Finally, even if a company is not trying to play favorites, self-enforcement of one’s own policies runs the risk of
censoring material that should not be removed while allowing
other more problematic content to remain. This risk is especially
present with the massive number of potential micro-targeted ads
being created.248 These internal and platform-to-platform inconsistencies could have a material impact on an election.
E.

Media Literacy Campaigns

Several governments have begun or are considering media
literacy campaigns, aimed at helping their citizens develop skills
to better identify false and misleading content.249 While such
programs are better than nothing and can help create more
informed consumers, they are almost certainly inadequate for
solving the problems caused by massive and widespread disinformation.250 It is very difficult for a nation to provide meaningful education to its citizens who have already completed their
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formal education.251 There is no effective way to bring all adults
in to receive this education, making it hard for such a campaign
to reach a nation’s entire electorate. As such, these programs are
most likely to be most effective for those still in school, but are
unlikely to reach the most vulnerable targets for misinformation:
the old and the poorly educated.252 Furthermore, with deep-fake
technology improving all the time, even sophisticated consumers
of information will become more susceptible to being misled. In
such a climate, it is difficult to imagine the truth winning in the
marketplace of ideas.
F.

Ban Political Advertising on Television and Digital
Platforms

While there are occasional mentions of the idea of banning
political advertising, it seldom receives serious consideration in
the United States.253 Given massive advertising costs, the corrupting influence of money on modern politics, and the prevalence of disinformation in advertising, it is time to reconsider this
alternative. The massive rise in misinformation has pushed
society to the point where it is preferable to ban false advertising,
as opposed to allowing the spread of lies, especially in an era
where misinformation can be narrowly targeted for maximum
effectiveness.254 In the two-week runup to the most recent
British election, Britain’s leading fact-checking organization Full
Fact identified over eighty-eight percent of the Conservative
Party’s digital ads as false or misleading.255
A ban on all television and digital political advertising would
remove a candidate’s need for large sums of money to get elected
and, with that, the influence major donors have over politi251
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cians.256 Considering where money gets spent during elections,
this ban would need to apply to all political television advertising.257 Less clear is whether it should also apply to internet and
social media advertising. Historic spending levels suggest that
removing television advertising would remove the overwhelming
majority of funds needed to run for office.258
However, internet and social media ad spending is growing
rapidly, given that people increasingly turn to these outlets for
their news and given the ability to micro-target potential voters
with ads most designed to appeal to them.259 Furthermore, if
television advertising alone was banned without currently
unconstitutional caps on political advertising spending, the large
sums of money currently being raised would likely just be
diverted to internet and social media. The only reason to consider excluding such materials is that most internet-based advertising can be viewed over longer periods and more carefully than TV
ads. Television ads, by virtue of their format, stream in real
time, often resulting in viewers not picking up on subtle caveats
and phraseology. Internet ads often have the potential to be
viewed as a page and carefully scrutinized, as videos can be
clicked on and viewed again so that the viewer can digest the
material as fully as desired. However, false content is no more
likely to be discovered by a viewer simply from careful or
multiple viewings, without referencing external information.260
Based on these considerations taken as a whole, both television
and internet advertising would need to fall within the scope of
the ban for it to be effective. Other types of advertising, including
radio, direct mail, and yard placards, are currently insignificant
and unlikely to absorb significant additional expenditures, given
their comparative effectiveness.261 As such, they should be exempt
from such a ban, thereby allowing some avenues for candidates
to get their message out.
Such a ban would allow politicians to spend far less time
fundraising and spend the time saved attending to their actual
jobs of legislating. More importantly, it would remove the leash
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held by lobbyists and big-money donors over politicians and allow
a candidate’s constituents to take primacy, thereby improving
the United States’ representative democracy. Given the reduced
need for money by candidates, a true publicly funded campaign
system could be financially viable. If implemented, this system
would remove any remaining corrupting influences of money on
the election process, though the need for such funds is likely to be
rather modest in light of advertising’s elimination. Similarly, it
would make it easier for people with less money to run for office
successfully.
Equally important, this ban effectively eliminates all the
misinformation being spread by deceptive advertising, regardless
of the source. Concerns about the future quality of deep-fakes
and their ability to deceive people would largely be eliminated.
All candidate advertising is banned, but so are ads by PACs and
super PACs. Web and social media ads, if based on a United
States platform, would be covered by the ban. As a result, everyone would know that if they saw a political ad, it must be from a
foreign source, and accordingly should not be trusted. Furthermore, concerns about decisionmaker bias do not apply since there
are no real decisions to be made, making a comprehensive ban
preferable to a ban based on misleading content.
A ban solves both the money in politics problems and the
misinformation problems, even extraterritorially. So, what are
the downsides of a ban? From a practical standpoint, there are
few negatives to this proposal. Obviously, there is some issue
with what exactly constitutes a political advertisement subject to
the ban, as many statements have political overtones or values
imbedded in them. This concern is less poignant than it might
appear at first glance. As proposed, advertisements that attack
or promote a candidate, party, or ballot initiative would be
prohibited. Public service announcements, like a piece on the
effects of climate change on rising coastal water levels, would be
excluded from the ban unless they are targeted at a jurisdiction
or populace in a jurisdiction that is voting on a matter related to
the public service accouncement’s message. The FEC currently
recognizes a difference between express advocacy, advocating for
or against a candidate or issue, and issue advocacy, support for
or against a policy, with most of the limited regulation being
directed at express advocacy.262 However, since policy issues can
262
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be voted upon apart from candidates, issue advocacy should be
included in the advertising ban. A new distinction based on
whether the advertisement is designed to promote voting
behavior in an upcoming election or merely designed to promote
support for a policy viewpoint generally should be used instead.
Another concern is that such a program could favor incumbents in political races, since they are better known than their
challengers, and challengers are perceived to need advertising to
make themselves known.263 While there is unquestionably some
truth in this concern, this objection is likely an oversimplification
of the incumbent’s advantage, and the disadvantage can be
mitigated. First, incumbents also generally possess a fundraising advantage over challengers.264 So if advertising is allowed,
the money advantage creates the same problems as being lesser
known if advertising were prohibited.265
Second, the ban applies to advertising, but not to appearing
on television generally. Thus, one way for a candidate to make
herself known is by appearing in a sanctioned debate. Given the
ban on advertising, every candidate listed on the ballot should
have a right to appear in any debate for the office. Since this
becomes one of the most important ways to get to know the
candidates who are running, debate viewership should increase,
especially if the electorate is not constantly being bombarded by
ads. Furthermore, a debate is the best place for a candidate to
put forth arguments for himself and against his opponents, as a
debate has built-in accountability—one’s opponent will call attention to any attempted misinformation. Another minor enhancement to debates from an advertising ban is that it essentially
removes a leading candidate’s ability to dodge debating her
opponents. With fewer ways to promote oneself, candidates will
have a strong incentive to participate in debates.
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See generally Bradley A. Smith, Campaign Finance Regulation, UNIV. OF VT.
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The other major way to get known is by appearing on
established television shows.266 This occurs regularly already,
with candidates regularly appearing on news and talk shows.
Like debates, these shows also provide a level of accountability
for truthfulness, albeit to a lesser extent, in the form of questions
and pushback from the host. While such pushback will be limited
when appearing on a friendly network, the need for a broader
appeal will motivate candidates to appear on multiple networks.
Furthermore, the veracity rating proposal discussed in the next
Section as an additional step would apply to television shows,
and will provide additional cautioning against misinformation
when candidates appear on a biased platform.267
The biggest problem with a ban is that it would clearly violate the First Amendment.268 A ban is neither narrowly tailored
nor the least restrictive means available, as required by current
jurisprudence. Such a barrier should not deter the United States
from adopting this approach, but it does mean that accomplishing such a step will likely take a significant period of time.
As such, one must consider other steps that can be taken in the
interim to help solve the problems facing our democracy.
While not a problem per se, a ban on political advertising
would do nothing to stop the spread of disinformation by biased
or disreputable news outlets.
G. Grade Content for Veracity
A final possible solution—one which the author of this
Article advocates taking in conjunction with a ban on television
and digital political advertising—is to develop a robust evaluation and grading system for political advertisements, news
networks, and news shows to inform consumers of information’s
veracity until a ban can go into effect. While political factchecking has been around for some time, and the idea of a
ratings system for political advertisements has been tossed
around by various commentators,269 there has been little attempt
to fully describe the details of such a system.

266
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The idea itself is rather simple: all political advertising—
until a ban is constitutional—will be rated on its level of veracity
before the ad is permitted to run. And every time the ad runs or
appears digitally, it must include a banner indicating the rating
it received. Similarly, news and opinion shows will receive
ratings that will be shown on-screen throughout the show, tied to
how forthrightly the shows present the news—with ratings based
on frequency and level of deception in what is reported.270 With
easily identifiable tags tied to veracity ratings, people can run
whatever advertisements and commentary they wish, and others
can consume whatever content they wish, but the consumer will
be clearly put on notice about the likelihood they are being
misled. Thus, the information consumer is put in a much better
position to decide whether the information being digested deserves additional scrutiny before being accepted. An enhanced
version of this approach in online media could include links in
the ratings banner to more detailed information on why the
advertisement is misleading.
Operationalizing this simple concept is somewhat more
complex. While such a system does not prohibit any content from
reaching consumers, the ratings are still likely to affect consumers substantially over time. As such, it is important to
construct this system carefully to minimize the government’s
role—both to minimize constitutional concerns and to diminish
the possibility of favoritism. Limiting the governmental role
would also maximize the likelihood that the ratings will be
impartial and accurate.
The first thing that must be considered is who gets to
conduct the ratings. If the government creates the ratings, this
unnecessarily entangles the government in regulating political
speech. More importantly, it raises the significant risk of bias in
favor of those in power.271 While allowing private parties to
control the process avoids these concerns, it runs a high risk of
the entire system becoming meaningless. If a private company
can choose to become a rater with few limitations on eligibility,
partisan companies will be formed in order to make high veracity
ratings available for advertisements and news programs aligning
with their orientations.

270
See Wood & Ravel, supra note 10, at 1229–34 (arguing that “Fake News” is
political advertising).
271
Hasen, supra note 11, at 56, 64.

662

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:615

Likewise, allowing content viewers to rate what they are
viewing is fraught with peril.272 The point of a ratings system is
to allow experts to help guide people who otherwise could be
deceived. The average person is unlikely to have the skills,
knowledge, or desire to conduct the fact check necessary to
establish a rating that is more than a personal preference.
Furthermore, in these polarized times, there is every reason to
believe that trolls would give great ratings to sites that confirm
their biases and to torpedo sites they disagree with, furthering
the self-selection echo chamber problem. One need only look to
Sean Spicer’s successful run on Dancing with the Stars, in spite
of being an objectively terrible dancer, to see how people can be
mobilized based on their political leanings to support a questionable cause.273
Given these concerns, the best approach to verification would
be a two-step process whereby one entity promulgates and enforces rules for eligible evaluators, and then approved evaluators
engage in the evaluation process. For the first step, allowing one
or more private parties to approve potential evaluators runs the
risk of bias in who gets approved, which would result in the
process being corrupted.
The better approach is to create a bipartisan commission
made up of an equal number of representatives from the Democratic and Republican parties.274 To avoid selection bias that
could occur if the president were empowered to nominate candidates for approval and to avoid the risk of unfilled vacancies,
both the majority and minority parties in one chamber of
congress would select an equal number of representatives to the
committee.275 Any entity wishing to become an evaluator would
apply to the committee for approval, and approval would require
the positive recommendation of a majority of the total committee.

272
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By requiring a majority of the committee to approve an applicant,
no applicant could be approved without some level of bipartisan
support. This obviously creates a risk of difficulties in getting
approved, but the consequences of this are far less harmful than
allowing one side to be able to approve biased raters, which could
undermine the credibility of the entire process. Furthermore,
since each side will want its candidates to be able to advertise,
there is a strong incentive to work together to get evaluators
approved.
The next question that must be answered is how this
commission decides whether to approve an applicant. In order to
know whether a company is capable of accurately evaluating the
veracity of content, one must examine its record for accuracy and
bias. As such, companies that have been engaged in rating
content for truthfulness for at least a year would be eligible for
immediate certification, pending a review by the commission of
their past year’s evaluations. Each year, a company will have to
reapply for certification based on the prior year’s activities to
ensure the company remains neutral in its evaluations. For companies with less than a year of evaluations, the committee can
provide a set of test evaluations for the applicant to perform,
which if passed would allow the company to begin evaluations for
the following six months, at which time it would be re-evaluated
based on its performance. After a full year of operations, it would
be evaluated again and move to a yearly renewal cycle. As
membership-based international fact-checking organizations
proliferate,276 the committee could decide that membership in
such an organization that has appropriately stringent membership requirements is sufficient for approval. Such deemed
sufficiency could further help prevent gridlock by the committee.
One risk to this model would be posed by a start-up company
that accurately performs any test created to get accredited but
does so with the intent, once licensed, of certifying biased
information in the critical months before an election. Even
though such a company would not be recertified, the company
276
See Glenn Kessler, Fact-Checking Organizations Around the Globe Embrace
Code of Principles, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www
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could nonetheless sow havoc for one election cycle and then go
out of business, only to re-emerge under a new name a few years
later to do the same again. Several measures should be taken to
combat this risk. First, new companies—those without a year of
past evaluations—should not be approved in the six-month
period before a major election cycle. This forces any applicants to
have a real and meaningful history that must be reviewed before
approval, when the stakes become important. Of course, a company could potentially do its job properly until the election cycle
heats up, only to reveal its true intent. To further combat this
scenario, the commission should have the power to bring civil
and criminal penalties against any company, and its officers,
whose accuracy in grading significantly departs from its historical record during an election cycle. Furthermore, companies
and their principals could be banned from future certification for
such activity. To make these sanctions effective, only companies
subject to enforceable United States sanctions can be approved.
In order to post a political advertisement, the candidate,
PAC, super PAC, or other person wishing to do so must first have
the advertisement rated by any approved evaluator. Allowing
groups to choose their evaluator minimizes the regulatory burden
being imposed on such party and allows one to avoid any
evaluator perceived as biased against one’s message. The ad will
then be allowed to run by including a banner stating the rating it
received. If a party is dissatisfied with a rating, she may have
another company perform a second evaluation, but both evaluations would have to be displayed with the ad. Posting an advertisement without its rating banner would subject the poster to
criminal penalties and the advertisement from being blocked or
removed. Posting a forged banner would subject the poster to
similar criminal liability.
The commission will develop the different gradations for
rating advertisements, but there should be at least four levels:
(1) highly inaccurate, misleading, or false, (2) somewhat inaccurate, misleading, or false, (3) mostly accurate or true, and
(4) highly accurate or true. The ratings banner should also have
a corresponding color code to make it conspicuous to the viewer.
While not absolutely necessary, an additional rating could be
created that labels shows and content that are parody or satire.
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Furthermore, search engine results could be ordered to make
results with more credible ratings appear higher in the results.277
A similar evaluation and disclosure process should also be
created for news and opinion shows. This step is necessary,
given the increasing number of news outlets with clear political
biases and the amount of opinion programing such networks
contain.278 As such, a number of these networks and programs
are actively engaged in disinformation,279 and the ability to create
a well-informed electorate will remain hampered if such a rating
system were confined to advertisements. However, it is impractical, if not impossible, to pre-rate news content as news is
developing. Furthermore, news outlets will invariably get some
information wrong as stories develop and news breaks, so ratings
will need to focus less on whether every detail in every story is
accurate and more on a general evaluation of how misleading the
show consistently is. As such, the ratings and banner should
reflect whether the program in question is (1) highly misleading
or untrustworthy, (2) somewhat misleading or untrustworthy,
(3) somewhat accurate or trustworthy, or (4) highly accurate or
trustworthy based on the prior two to three months’ content. By
evaluating relatively recent content over a period of time, shows
will have an incentive to maintain a higher rating by minimizing
bias and deception. Similarly, user-created content from highprofile people, like tweets from a politician, could be rated based
on accuracy of recent content, with the account having the rating
appended to each post.
Finally, an information campaign must be established to
help people understand the color-coded rating system. While
many may not fully understand the system at first, the pervasive
scope of the system will become well known and well understood
by everybody. This would be similar to how virtually every
277
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American can now recite the Miranda warning,280 even though it
was created in the case of Miranda v. Arizona,281 and was not
immediately known by the public. One important component of
this campaign will be to instill in the public that any web-based
content without a rating should be considered highly inaccurate,
misleading, or false. This is a necessary step to solve the
problem of extraterritorial sources of disinformation. Since the
internet is global, this United States’ rating and disclosure
system will be unable to force foreign sites to comply. However,
as people come to understand the banner system, the lack of a
rating will effectively act as a poor rating—viewers will know
that no rating means it is a foreign site and should be viewed
with suspicion. If someone posts a fake banner, that site will be
blocked.
This approach has a number of positive attributes. First, it
should pass the strict scrutiny test applied to free speech.282 The
government clearly has a compelling state interest in ensuring
its citizens are not misinformed, especially about political
matters.283 The regulation is narrowly tailored to accomplish this
goal by merely providing information as to likely issues with
veracity to put viewers on notice, without blocking such content
or otherwise restricting people from viewing whatever content
they wish. Finally, it is hard to imagine a less restrictive means
to help people avoid being deceived by misinformation than
posting a warning about the risk that what one is looking at
might be misleading.
Second, even if bias creeps into the approval or ratings
system, the harms caused by a warning are far less than the
harms that can occur as a result of trying to ban false and
misleading content. Furthermore, with a bipartisan approval
process, regular renewal requirements, a pre-election barrier on
new evaluators, and the economic incentive of raters to be hired
for evaluation, there are numerous checks to minimize the risk of
bias. Additionally, color-coded banners will constantly remind
280
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consumers of the risks associated with the content they are
consuming, in a manner that deals with both domestic and
foreign sources of misinformation, since there is a clear message
to a viewer if there is no banner.
As people come to understand the system fully and trust its
ratings over time, politicians, their supporters, and news programming will all have an incentive to be more truthful and
accurate to avoid getting poor ratings. As such, the system not
only helps inform consumers but also creates a positive-feedback
loop that improves the overall quality of information being
disseminated. This in turn should help bring society back to a
place where people trust the news and have common agreement
about the facts of a situation, even if they disagree on how to deal
with a given situation.
As for downsides to this approach, there are few. Obviously,
such a system does nothing to combat the corrosive influence of
money on politics, which is why it should be pursued in conjunction with a constitutional amendment that would permit banning
all political advertising. Furthermore, people will likely object,
especially in the early phases of such a system, if their preferred
information sources receive poor ratings. While this may hurt
the acceptance of the system in the short term, information
sources will want good ratings, causing them to adjust their
behavior and the situation to correct itself. To decrease the risk
of such pushback in the program’s infancy, one option is to have
the rating system apply to only political advertisements for the
first few years, so that people can get accustomed to the system
without it being perceived to attack an information source that
has established trust with its viewers. Once people are used to
the system, it could be expanded to news and news opinion
programming, hopefully prompting people to reevaluate what
they have been consuming if necessary. Finally, there is a cost to
having to rate all of this material, but that cost should be
minimal compared to the costs of creating content and
purchasing advertising time.
CONCLUSION
As America worked its way through the 2020 election
campaign cycle, it was clear that democracy was struggling.
There were, and still are, concerns associated with voter disenfranchisement due to unduly strict voter identification standards,
inadequate access to polling stations, and politically motivated
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purging of voter rolls. There were, and still are, concerns about
the equality of peoples’ votes due to gerrymandering. There
were, and still are, concerns about the erosion of the constitutional system of checks and balances, as the executive branch
grows ever more powerful. There were, and still are concerns
about the corrupting influence of money in an era of exponential
growth in campaign spending. And there were, and still are concerns about misinformation being disseminated to the masses, by
politicians, those acting on their behalf, and foreign-state actors
with malicious intent. While no one set of actions will address all
of these concerns, it is imperative for the long-term health of the
country that these matters are dealt with.
The current corrosive influence of money on politics and the
dissemination of disinformation are, in the final analysis,
essentially problems with how the United States regulates
political speech. The nation and its court system remain wedded
to a historical notion that democracy is best served by allowing a
full and robust marketplace of ideas, free of virtually any
restraints, regardless of the degree to which money removes
power from the people or to which misinformation corrupts the
market. Given the well-established effectiveness of misinformation in the modern era and the corrupting influence of money on
the electoral process, the United States’ democracy can no longer
afford its laissez fare approach to regulating political speech.
However, the risks are very high when one starts restricting
political speech. There is a long history of repressive regimes
stifling dissenting voices to maintain and increase power, and
there is a substantial likelihood that any powers granted to the
government to limit political speech will be misused by those in
power for their own benefit.
As such, any regulation of political speech must be carefully
constructed to minimize or eliminate these risks of abuse while
addressing the underlying problems caused by money and
disinformation on the electoral process. When the potential
solutions to these problems are fully considered in light of the
risks each alternative presents, the best approach becomes clear.
To deal with the long-term corrupting influence that money has
on the political process, as well as the pervasive rise in disinformation from multiple sources, banning political advertising on
television, the internet, and social media is the best approach. It
would not only effectively remove the need politicians have for
vast sums of money, but also remove most avenues for spreading
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disinformation, while allowing more accurate information to flow
in as a result. Unfortunately, this solution requires a constitutional amendment or radical change in jurisprudence, so it is a
long-term solution to work toward.
In the interim, a robust rating and disclosure regime for
political advertising would significantly reduce the effectiveness
of disinformation, would help promote the spread of accurate
information, and would pose minimal risks of abuse. By expanding such a regime to include news network programming, this
approach would similarly promote better and more accurately
informed voters, making it a desirable modification regardless of
whether political advertisements can be banned.
While these approaches will not eliminate all the challenges
facing the modern democracy of the United States, they can solve
most of the problems being caused by the way political speech is
currently regulated.

